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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Agency
INJURIES TO WIFE AS RESULT OF HUSBAND'S NEGLIGENCE -
LIABILITY OF HUSBAND'S EMPLOYER -SCOPE OF EM-
PLOYMENT.
The Appellate Court in the case of The Metropolitan Life Insur-
anoe Co. v. Huff, 48 Ohio App. 412, 16 Abs. 540 (1933) was re-
cently forced to choose which one of two much debated paths to travel.
For, as it pointed out in its decision, there was as yet no precedent to be
found in Ohio cases. Here a wife, with the consent of her husband's
employer, was riding in the employer's automobile which the husband
was driving while in the course of his employment making collections.
As a result of the husband's negligence and without any contributory
negligence on her part, the wife was injured in an accident. She sued
the employer for damages received and was allowed to recover. The
Court based the employer's liability on the ground of a breach of duty
owed the plaintiff, which duty's assertion did not depend upon the rela-
tionship of the employer's agent and the party injured. This case has
been subsequently reversed upon other grounds immaterial to our dis-
cussion. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Huff, 128 Ohio St. 469,
191 N.E. 761, 2 Ohio Op. 23 (1934).
Although there are relatively few decisions on this question, the
majority of the earlier cases refused to allow recovery on facts similar
to those in the principal case. In Maine v. James Maine and Sons Co.
198 Iowa 1278, 2oi N.W. 20, 37 A.L.R. 161 (1924), the plaintiff
was injured while riding in a company car with her husband, the secre-
tary and general manager of the firm, due to his careless driving. The
court disallowed the claim on the grounds that since the plaintiff could
not sue her husband at common law, there was no basis for any recovery
against the company on the theory of respondeat superior. Furthermore,
"If recovery may be had by the wife against the employer, and he in
turn may recover against the husband, the family wealth remains the
same, except as diminished by the expenses of litigation. It would seem
that to permit a recovery against the employer results simply in counten-
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ancing an encircling movement where a frontal attack upon the husband
is inhibited."
In Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 710, 54 L.R.A. 649 (1901) it is
said, "The act of an employee even in legal intendment, is not the act
of his employer, unless the employer either previously directs the act to
be done or subsequently ratifies it. For injuries caused by the negligent
act of an employee not directed or ratified by the employer, the employee
is liable, because he committed the act which caused the injury; while
the employer is liable, not as if the act was done by himself, but because
of the" doctrine of respondeat superior, the rule of law which holds the
master responsible for the negligent act of his servant, committed while
the servant is acting within the general scope of his employment and
engaged in his master's business. The primary liability to answer for
such an act therefore rests upon the employee and when the employer
is compelled to answer in damages therefore, he can recover over against
the employee."
The Supreme Court of the United States took a similar attitude in
the case of the New Orleans and N.E.R.R. Co. v. Jopes, 142 U.S. 18,
12 Su. Ct. 109, 35 L.E. 919 (1891). A comparatively recent case
declared: "Suits between spouses should be confined as heretofore to
those having contractual elements or where there is direct statutory
authorization, and suits by a spouse against third persons grounded upon
the tort of the other spouse, and without contractual elements, fall in
the same category." Emerson v. Western Seed and Irrigation Co., i 16
Neb. I8O, 216 N.W. 297 (1927).
These cases have, however, been severely criticized in numerous
articles, notes, and comments. 38 Harv. Law Rev. 824 (1925);
25 Col. L. Rev. 377 (1925); 9 Minn. Law Rev. 485 (1925); 3 vVis-
L. Rev. 188 (1925); and 23 111. L. Rev. 174 (1928).
The more recent cases disclose that the courts are no longer adher-
ing to the doctrines asserted by the earlier decisions. Mr. Justice
Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, in a
forceful opinion in the case of Schubert v. A4ugust Schubert Wagon Co.,
249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42, 64 A.L.R. 293 (1928) said: "A tres-
pass, negligent or willful upon the person of a wife does not cease to be
a trespass though the law exempts the husband from liability for the
damage. Others may not hide behind the skirts of his immunity. The
trespass may be a crime for which even a husband may be punished,
but whether criminal or not, unlawful it remains. As well might one
argue that an employer commanding a husband to commit a battery on
a wife, might justify the command by the victim's disability. The em-
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ployer must answer for the damage, whether there is trespass by direct
command, or trespass incidental to the business committed to the serv-
ant's keeping. In each case the maxim governs that he who acts through
another, acts by himself." In accord is Poulin v. Graham 102 Vt.. 307,
147 Ad. 698 (1929): "The right to sue a husband's master is not
foreclosed because the wife cannot sue her husband for negligence. The
right to proceed against the master is in no sense subordinate or sec-
ondary to the right against the servant. It is primary and independent."
Upon facts similar to those in Poulin v. Graham a recovery was
allowed in the case of Sidney Chase v. New Haven Waste Material
Corp. iii Conn. 377, 15o Ad. 107 (1930), where an unemancipated
child was allowed to recover from his father's master. The court there
decided that "the master's responsibility for the negligence of his servant
is bottomed upon a rule of public policy and social justice and rests on
the broad ground that every man who prefers to manage his affairs
through others, remains bound to so manage them that third persons are
not injured by any breach of legal duty on the part of such others while
they are engaged in his business and within the scope of their authority.
The master's duty is in no sense derivative from the servant's liability."
A recent Wisconsin case has in reality anticipated the view adopted
in the principal case, "Though in the state of Ohio, in the jurisdiction
of which the cause of action arose and by the laws of which it must be
governed, a wife may not sue her husband for a tort committed upon
her by him, the question as to whether she may nevertheless sue her
husband's employer for injuries sustained by reason of her husband's
negligence while acting in the service of such employer not having been
decided in such state, is determined in the affirmative, in accordance with
what is concluded to be the sounder reasoning of the cases in other
jurisdictions; the wrongful act of the husband to his wife does not cease
to be wrongful merely because the wife may not recover damages from
him" Hensel v. Hensel Yellow Cab Co., 209 Wis. 489, 245 N.W.
159 (932).
The motive behind the refusal of the courts to countenance a tort
action by a wife against her husband was an endeavor to promote do-
mestic tranquility, and not to affect relationships with third parties.
"The doctrine rests not only on the ground of the merged existence,
but also on account of the unflattering spectacle presented by husband
and wife seeking pecuniary compensation from one another for personal
wrongs" Eversley, Domestic Relations, p. 240 (1925). The wisdom
of extending this rule in a way such as was never intended, so as to bar
recovery of the wife against third parties where a tortious injury actually
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exists, is certainly questionable. To say that the act of the servant was
lawful because committed against his wife would be to pervert the mean-
ing and effect of the disability. The chief bone of contention, it seems,
has been whether the liability of the master is primary or secondary,
derivative or non-derivative. Less emphasis should be placed on this
phase of the controversy, and more careful thought given to the broad
and general principles behind the employer's liability. He has been held
responsible because it has been found desirable that those injuries inci-
dental to carrying on an enterprise be made a part of the cost of opera-
tion. Tiffany, Agency, p. 100, 2nd Ed. (1924). Are there any prac-
tical reasons that necessitate a different result here? It is believed not.
It may be argued that the servant in driving for the defendant, was
engaged in the project of earning a living for himself and his wife, and
that the project should bear its costs of operation. But such a rule, if
carried to its logical conclusion, would disable any one dependent for
support on the negligent employee from suing the employer for injuries.
If we can apply the analogy of a contract and say that the transaction
was between the injured party and the principal, thus regarding the
agent husband as a mere conduit, it is difficult to see why a personal
disability existing between husband and wife (inter se) should be allowed
to defeat the wife's right to recover.
WALTER LEAR GORDON, JR.
LIABILITY OF AGENT ON SIGNATURE MADE IN BEHALF OF
CORPORATION - NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
The plaintiff company held two promissory notes, reading, "I, we,
or either of us, promise to pay," etc., and signed, "Central Freight-
ways, Inc., John L. Cannon, Jr., Treas., Lyman H. Treadway, V. P."
The plaintiff brought an action on these notes against the agents whose
signatures appeared thereon. The defendants demurred to the petition
on the ground that it did not state a cause of action against the agents.
The demurrer was sustained and plaintiff appealed. Held, that, under
Section 8125, Ohio General Code, the individual signers are not per-
sonally liable. Weygandt, C. J., dissented. Cannon, Jr. v. Miller
Rubber Co., 128 Ohio St. 72, i9O N.E. 210, 39 O.L.R. 656, 40 Bull.
145 (1934).
The statute above referred to, being identical with Section 20 of
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, provides that "When the
instrument contains or a person adds to his signature words indicating
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